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The journal of Legal Education did all legal educators a great service when 
it published "Women in Legal Education-Pedagogy, Law, Theory, and 
Practice,"1 a symposit.Jm that highlights feminist criticisms of, innovations 
in, and desiderata for legal education. The contributors challenge some of 
our deepest convictions about what it means to be a law teacher. Appro­
priately, all the contributors are women. It is they who have experienced 
most keenly-and have been harmed by_:_the gendered 11ature of the legal 
educational process. The gendered nature of legal education is not, 
however, a "women's only" issue; it is not solely "their problem," "their 
burden." Male educators, as benefactors and agents of gender bias in legal 
education, must also confront the problem and acknowledge their respon­
sibilities. They must interrogate their own presuppositions; they must 
re-vision their own pedagogy, scholarship, and administrative activities; 
they must practice affirmative action in their professional and personal 
lives. Gender bias can only be thoroughly eliminated through the critical 
self-conscious agency of its practitioners.2 What follows is a male teacher's 
reflection on his first year of teaching, on his aspiration to make the issue 
of gender a central concern, and on some of the dangers and opportunities 
involved in such an enterprise. 
For several years now, I have been seriously concerned about legal 
education. Ever since my first exposure to law school in British-occupied 
Northern Ireland, I have been perturbed by the political agnosticism of 
many legal educators. In Ireland, the stance was designed in part to 
obfuscate personal preference� for continued colonial links with a defunct 
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I. 38J. Legal Educ. 1-193 (1988). 
2. The risk of calling for male involvement in the 1·econstruction of legal educatio11 is that 
male domination will be reconstituted. Some males may "bandwagon" and appropriate 
the feminist critique in order to establish a new male hegemony that once again silences 
women "for their own good." There is no easy way to avoid the risk. All thar can be 
hoped fo1· is that the men who participate in reconstructive efforts will continue to listen 
to their feminist o·itics, to recognize the clangt:TS of neoimperialism, and co respond 
accordingly. 
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British Empire. In North America, advocates of the autonomy of law, 
although perhaps not quite as obscurantist as their Anglo-Irish counter­
parts, also claim a fundamental distinction between law and politics, which 
they use to deny the partisan nature of law in relation to issues of gender, 
race, and class.3 
First-year legal education is especially disconcerting. Despite the best 
intentions of some of its practitioners, the effects of legal education on 
first-year law students may be personally, socially, and politically detrimen­
tal. Because it disconnects law from the reality of its sociocultural contexts 
and canonizes legal texts, discourses, and reasoning, first-year legal educa­
tion inculcates primarily male,4 nineteenth-century,5 bourgeois6 values and 
"knowledge." By delineating the limits of legitimate legal discourse,7 it 
excludes "different voices."8 Law teachers, in a desire to forge the well­
trained "legal mind," set in motion a decidedly dangerous dynamic_!! By 
deliberately decomposing our students' pre-law school experiences, by 
denying a past that is constitutive of their very identities as persons, we 
encourage the r.ole to swallow the person. 10 As a result, law teachers 
frequently cripple students both intellectually and politically• 1 and even 
induce significant psychological distress. 12 Worse still, and perhaps unwit-
3. For an extended influential discussion of the claim that .. it is all politics," see Roberto 
Mangabeira Unger, Social Theory, Its Siwation and Task (New York, 1987), and False 
Necessity (New York, 1987); see also Roberto Unger, The Critical Legal Studies 
Movement (Cambridge. Mass., 1986). 
4. James R. Elkins (ed.}, Worlds of Silence: Women the Law School, 8 ALSA F. I (1984); 
Nancy S. Erickson, Legal Education: The Last Academic Bastion of Sex Bias? 10 Nova 
L.J. 457 (1986); Mary Joe Frug. Re-reading Contracts: A Feminist Analysis of a 
Contracts Casebook, 34 Am. U.L. Rev. 1065 (1985); Jennifer Jaff, Frame-Shifting: An 
Empowering Methodology for Teaching and Learning Legal Reasoning. 36 J. Legal 
Educ. 249, 258-61 (1986); Mary O'Brien & Sheila McIntyre, Patriarchal Hegemony and 
Legal Education, 2 Can. J. Women & L. 69 (1986); Faith Seidenbcrg, A Neglected 
Minority-Women in Law School, 10 Nova L.J. 843 (1986); K. C. Worden, Overshoot­
ing the Target: A Feminist Deconstruction of Legal Education, 34 Am. U.L. Rev. 1141 
(1985). See also Taunya Lovell Banks, Gender Bias in the Classroom, 38 J. Legal Educ. 
137 (1988); Mary Irene Coombs, Crime in the Stacks, or a Tale of a Text: A Feminist 
Response to a Criminal Law Textbook, 38 J. Legal Educ. 117 ( 1988); Nancy S. Erickson, 
Sex Bias in Law School Courses: Some Common Issues, 38 J. Legal Educ. 101 (1988); 
Elizabeth M. Schneider, Task Force Reports on Women in the Courts: The Challenge 
for Legal Education, 38 J. Legal Educ. 87 ( 1988); Ann Shalleck, Report of the Women 
and the Law Project: Gender Bias· and the Law School Curriculum, 38 J. Legal Educ. 97 
(1988). 
5. Karl E. Klare, The Law-School Curriculum in the 1980s: What's Left? 32 J. Legal Educ. 
336 (1982); MortonJ. Horo"'.itz, Are Law Schools Fifty Years Out of Date? 54 UMKC 
L. Rev. 385 (1986); Elizabeth Mensch, The History of Mainstream Legal Thought, in 
The Politics of Law, ed. David Kairys, 18 (New York, 1982). 
6. O'Brien & McIntyre, supra note 4; Peter Gabel & Jay M. Feinman, Contract Law As 
Ideology, in Kairys, supra note 5, at I 72; Richard L. Abel, Torts, id. at 185. 
7. Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse: Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis 
(New York, I 987). 
8. Carol Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge, Mass., 1982). 
9. Klare, supra note 5. 
IO. Robert Kerry Wilkins, "The Person You Are Supposed to Become .. : The Politics of the 
Law School Experience, 45 U. Toronto Fae. L. Rev. 98 (1987). 
I 1. Stephen C. Halpern, The Politics and Pathology of Legal Education, 32 J. Legal Educ. 
383 (1982). 
12. G. A. H. Benjamin, Alfred Kaszniak, Bruce Sales & Stephen B. Shanfield, The Role of 
Legal Education in Producing Psychological Distress Among Law Students and Lawyers, 
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tingly. the vast majo1·ity of us demand that students accept as necessary, and 
acquiesce in, unjustifiable hierarchy and deference.•� Moreover, the con­
sequences of such an impoverished pedagogy are culturally pervasive and 
socially systemic. As a central component in the training, controlling, and 
disciplining of students, legal education plays a vital role in molding some 
of the key technicians of the "disciplinary society." 14 
In short, contemporary legal education is about power and powerless­
ness; it is a microcosm of the structures of domination and subordination in 
our postindustrial, patriarchal society. 
I. Consciousness-Raising 
I am a legal educator. Last year I taught a course entitled "Legal 
Research and Writing" (LRW) at Osgoode Hall Law School. 15 I was not a 
professor; rather, I was given the more lowly title and position of "sessional 
lecturer" and "instructor." As an LRW instructor, I was close to the bottom 
of the totem pole of legal education; below me there were the students, 
secretaries, and maintenance staff. I had power, but only in limited 
amounts, and only in relation to my subordinates. 
The LRW program is one of the most difficult, demanding, and 
labor-intensive courses to teach. 16 In many ways it is the most important 
1986 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 225; Andrew S. Watson, The Quest for Professional 
Competence: Psychological Aspects of Legal Education, 37 U. Cin. L. Rev. 91 (1968); 
Wilkins, su/na no1e 10. 
13. Toni Pickard, Experience As Teacher: Discovering the Politics of Law Teaching, 33 U. 
Toronto L.J. 279 (1983), and I s  Real Life Finally Happening? 2 Can. J. Women & L. 150 
(I 986); Duncan Kennedy, Legal Education and the Reproduction of Hierarchy: A 
Polemic Against the System (Cambridge, Mass., 1983), and Liberal Values in Legal 
Education, 10 Nova L.J. 603 (1986); James C. Foster, The "Cooling Out" of Law 
Students, 3 Law & Pol'y Q. 243 ( I 981 ); Klare, supra note 5. Wilkins, supra note I 0. See 
also Carrie Menkcl-Meadow, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Legal Studies, and Legal 
Education or MThe Fem-Crits Go to Law School," 38 J. Legal Educ. 61 (1988). 
14. Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish (New York, 1977). 
15. This article is written in the perfect tense. Earlier drafts were written in the present 
tense, in the last couple of weeks of my experience as an LRW instructor. The final draft 
was written one year after the events it recounts. It is appropriate, I think, to 
acknowledge the temporal shift captured in the linguistic distinction between present 
tense and past tense, in which the process of retrospective reflection replaces the 
immediacy of contemporaneous reporting. It is my hope that in the interim, and 
through the reworkings of the article, I have managed to retain as much as I can of the 
authenticity of my experience. Every form of communication-whether contemporary 
or ex post facto-is mediated rather than immediate, encoded rather than essential, and 
therefore necessarily partisan. Therefore my ruminations are subjective and not neutral. 
They do not claim to be a reporting of "the facts"; they are not intended to ventriloquize 
what the students have said or reenact what they have done. Theirs may very well be a 
different "story." What I have attempted is an honest reconstruction from my point of 
view, capturing in words "the then" and "the now." 
16. The job description reads as follows: 
The Legal Research and Writing Program is designed to introduce first year law 
students to the basic principles and techniques of legal analysis, writing and 
research. Lecturers meet students weekly in a large group and also in seminar 
groups of about twenty students, conduct workshops, ·grade assignments and 
generally provide timely feedback and criticism on the work submit1ed by the 
students. The lecturers have some discretion in the planning and presentation of 
the Legal Research and Writing Program subject to the overall direction of the 
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course in any law school's curriculum in that it provides students with the 
technical talents-the grammar of law, if you wil l-that are fundamental 
and essential to their effective and successful participation in other courses. 
Everybody knows this, but, paradoxically, the "real" professors will not 
shoulder the burden ; they will not do such pedantic work. Rather, they will 
leave it up to transient labor 1 7-"cannon fodder," as one of my more cheery 
coinstructors described us-upon which disoriented and disenchanted 
first-year students can vent their frustration. At the same time, because "the 
faculty" cannot trust these strangers at their margin, the course is institu­
tionally circumscribed, its basic structure preordained, and much of the 
materials "fixed". The ideal instructor is the automaton, one who facilitates 
the smooth running of the program, one who determines that the students 
are technically competent to deal with substantive courses, and most 
important, one who ensures that nothing conflicts with the desires of the 
professors. "Know your place and your purpose" is the unspoken maxim 
for the LRW instructor. 
The LRW course is a paradigm of training for hierarchy. We introduce 
students to the techniques and methodologies that will enable them to 
think, write, and speak "like lawyers." 1 8  LRW instructors are the progeni­
tors of the propaganda of objectivity and neutrality. 1 9  We emphasize and 
grade for (coerce) rationality, detachment, and dispassion. We construct 
practico-academic exercises such as case briefs (better known as "finding 
the ratio"), case syntheses (better known as "finding a legal reconciliation 
for the politically irreconcilable"), and the ominous sounding "memoranda 
of fact and law." The last of these is classically hierarchical; we cast the legal 
neophyte in the role of an articling student in a large "downtown" firm who 
dutifully and respectfully does the slog for her distinguished senior, usually 
Assistant Dean; they also work with the other first year law professors in 
developing the necessary workshops and assignments. Each instructor assumes 
responsibilities for approximately sixty-five first year law students. 
17. From the viewpoint of equality, the terms of employment for the position leave much to 
be desired. Instructors are hired on a ten-month contract, renewable for one further 
ten-month period, and are paid about sixty percent of a first-year tenure-track law 
professor's salary at the same university. Although the work load of instructors is 
substantially heavier than that of their tenure-track counterparts, the ratio of their 
earnings parallels that of the average salary differential-greater than one third-be­
tween women and men in contemporary North American society. It is also worth noting 
that Richard Chused's 1986-87 study on the composition of United States law faculties 
indicates that women hold seventy percent of all legal writing positions but only 15.9 
percent of all tenured or tenure-track positions. See Schneider, supra note 4, at 89 n. 1 1 .  
When I taught the course at Osgoode Hall, the positions were occupied by three men 
and two women. 
18. The concept and practice of "thinking like a lawyer" is one of the ungraspable carrots 
that is continually dangled in front of students. However, despite its status as one of the 
organizing principles of legal education, the teaching community has left the concept 
remarkably underdeveloped. Could this be because "thinking like a lawyer" is more 
myth than reality; because lawyers-and this includes the judiciary- think as instrumen­
tally, self-interestedly, subjectively, and politically as the rest of us; and because the only 
difference is in the rationalization or obfuscation, not in the processes? 
For a useful critical conception of what "thinking like a lawyer" means, see Jay M. 
Feinman & Marc Feldman, Achieving Excellence: Mastery Learning in Legal Education, 
35 J. Legal Educ. 528 (1985). See also Klare, supra note 5, for some very sketchy 
suggestions. 
19. See also Jaff, supra note 4. 
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"a partner." Ultimately, the course concludes with a whimpering moot in 
the law school's equivalent of the Court of Appeal. The process is oriented 
towards reproducing "appellate courtitis,"20 once again under the assump­
tion that this is where the action really is. In preparation for this day of 
reckoning, we pepper the academic year with tawdry anecdotes about great 
litigants, past and present, which reinforce the students' delusions of 
grandeur and visions of the jurisprudential splendor that can be 
theirs . . . but always and only if they play their cards right. 
This is a gloomy but in my opinion accurate synopsis of first-year legal 
education in general, and LRW in particular. It is hardly an optimistic 
starting point for transgressive legal education. 
Power, however, is neither unidirectional nor unidimensional; it should 
not be conceived of as purely repressive, as "power over." Despite the 
predilections of the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Canadian Bar 
Association, legal education, like the state,21 is not an unassailable monolith 
that irremediably ali�nates students and undercuts their social, political, 
relational, and communal values. Legal education is polymorphous and 
heterogeneous; it necessarily localizes and decentralizes power and there­
fore provides interstitial opportunities for resistance. The LRW pro­
gram-in spite of, indeed because of, its lowly position-provides an arena 
in which we can endeavour to discover and develop "emancipatory trojan 
horses"22 within the citadel of contemporary legal education.23 
My goal for the winter term of the LRW program was to reconstruct a 
legal academic exercise into a process of political sensitization. The formal 
structure of the course provided a valuable opportunity for students to 
engage in a fairly major piece of research, followed by the articulation of 
pro-and-con arguments in both written and oral form. I felt that the 
opportunity was too good to miss and chose as my topic the vexed 
sociopolitical problem of the legal regulation of pornography. I hoped that 
the overlap between law, politics, and gender could be made inescapable 
and that the chimera of the neutrality of the law could be banished. I could 
use my position of power to confront sixty-four (potential) power holders 
with an immediate, real, and highly charged politicolegal problem. 
I constructed a hypothetical problem for the students: An amendment 
had been added to the Ontario Human Rights Code 1 98024 that, among other 
things, provided for a prohibition against "trafficking in pornography" on 
the ground that pornography discriminates against women. The amend­
ment was modelled on Andrea Dworkin and Catharine A. MacKinnon's 
20. Jerome Frank, Courts on Trial 222-24 (Princeton, N.J., 1949). 
21 . Sec further, Richard F. Devlin, Law's Centaur: A Preliminary Theoretical Inquiry into 
the Nature and Relations of Law, State and Violence, 26 Osgoode Hall L.J . (1988) 
(forthcoming). 
22. Robert Samek, The Objects and LimiLS of Law Reform 13 1  (unpublished report, Law 
Reform Commission of Canada, 1 976). 
23. This discussion of power and resistance is influenced by the work of Michel Foucault. 
See in particular Michel Foucault, Knowledge and Power (New York, 1980), and l The 
History of Sexuality (New York, 1978). 
24. Stat. Ont. 1981, ch. 53. 
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antipomography ordinances25 but "doctored" to suit the academic ele­
ments of the course.26 The legal exercise required inquiries into the division 
of powers between the provincial and federal governments27 and Charter211 
issues. But these were not my main motivation. 
More important from my perspective was the dynamic that I was 
attempting to put in place. The students were "forced" to encounter, 
contemplate, and assess certain feminist interpretations of pornography. 
They became aware of the harms that pornography causes women-some­
thing many of them probably would not have done voluntarily. Pornogra­
phy had, therefore, become an issue in their lives that they could no longer 
avoid, because to get a grade they had to take the issue seriously. In turn, 
feminism had taken a higher profile in many of their lives, it had become 
part of their psyche whether they wanted it to or not. Benignly, I opened 
25. Variations of the antipornography ordinances were passed in both Minneapolis and 
Indianapolis, only to be vetoed or struck down as unconstitutional. For a text of the 
Minneapolis Ordinance, see Appendix: The MacKinnon/Oworkin Pornography Ordi­
nance, 1 1  Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. I I 9 (1985). For an excellent social, political, and legal 
history of the ordinances, sec Paul Brest & Ann Vandenberg, Politics, Feminism and the 
Constitution: The Anti-Pornography Movement in Minneapolis, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 607 
( I 987). 
26. One critic of the project has argued that the way I set up the problem suggests that I, the 
power holder, do not support antipornography legislation. My critic claims that the way 
I structured the issue sent a clear message to the students that it was an unconstitutional 
law. I have reflected on the criticism at length. As to my own position on the ordinance 
in general, I am still undecided. I am convinced that such is the indeterminacy and 
plasticity of Canadian constitutional doctrine that arguments could be made both ways. 
It will all depend on the hidden assumptions of those who make the decision. I do, 
however, have strong reservations about whether progressive movements-within which 
I include feminism-should build so much of their emancipatory strategy on legal 
terrain. But if the ordinance is the way that feminists as a community decide to go, I will 
not add my voice to the chorus of critics. See also Richard F. Devlin, Nomos and 
Thanatos: Pans I and II, 12 Dalhousie L.J . ( 1989) (forthcoming). 
I have also discussed the assignment on a few occasions with Professor MacKinnon, 
and although she had strong criticisms of the project in general, she did not appear to 
believe that I had "set her work up." I do not know if she has changed her mind since 
our last conversation. 
Many academics and practitioners who took part in the judging aspect of the 
assignment went both ways, which suggests that the project was not as tilted as my critic 
suggests. The process of setting up the assignment was, however, somewhat convoluted. 
A colleague suggested that a good moot problem could be centered around a case that 
had just been argued in the Supreme Court of Canada, Rio Hotel Limited v. Liquor 
Licensing Board, [ I 987] 2 S.C.R. 59. The case raises issues about the separation of 
powers between the federal and provincial governments and also about the extent of the 
provincial criminal law power. Because two distinct issues were necessal)· to fulfill the 
academic requirements of the moot, I superimposed the antipornography amendment 
on the Rio Hotel analysis and highlighted certain aspects of the criminal law issue. I also 
informed the students that this was a corrupted version of the MacKinnon-Dworkin 
ordinance (see supra note 25). 
27. Under the British North American Act, 1867, 30  & 31 Viet., ch. 3 (U.K.), the Canadian 
constitutional structure is divided into two mutually exclusive spheres of legislative 
authority: federal and provincial. Should either the federal or provincial legislatures 
interfere with the realm of the other, the courts will determine that such intervention is 
ultra vires. 
28. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 
(Schedule B of the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.)) can be loosely understood as a 
Canadian equivalent to the United States Bi_ll of Rights, so long as we do not minimize 
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their minds to a contemporary social problem and various perspectives 
upon it; malignly, I used my position of power to force them to think about 
at least one aspect of the feminist critique of patriarchal society. 
There was a further, more complicated, side to the politicoeducational 
process. The vehicle that I adopted as a pornographic movie was the 
controversial 9 ½ Weeks. Although for me the movie was on the borderline, 
it could be interpreted as pornographic on the basis of the anti pornography 
ordinance. This obviously piqued the sensibilities of many who would, 
perhaps, tolerate "censorship" of blatant hardcore pornography, but who 
would be concerned about the repression of "pretty pornography," despite 
the ideological messages it might carry with it. Hard cases make for a good 
politics of law. 
I also attempted to provide the class with an opportunity for nonhier­
archical participatory democracy. Although on the strictly academic level it 
was unnecessary for the students to see the movie, I raised the issue of 
whether it would be appropriate to view the movie in the law school in 
order to provide a social context for their academic exercise. I informed 
them that I did not want to be the one to decide, that I regarded them as 
a microcommunity of sixty-four who had to make a decision whether to 
show a pornographic movie in their environment. If they could not make 
a decision, how could they expect a larger, diversified Canadian community 
to make a decision? 
The initial response to my foisting communal responsibility on them was 
one of confusion over why there could even be a problem. The main 
sentiment expressed was what I would describe as "liberal laissez-faire": If 
the movie was the vehicle for the assignments, then the students should 
have an opportunity to see it, even though it was not strictly necessary for 
successful completion of the problem. Those who might be offended by it 
did not have to see it. Against the liberal viewpoint was a minority but 
equally "obvious" position :  It was not academically necessary to see it; 
pornography harms, therefore the movie should not be shown in the law 
school. To show the movie would be to "turn the law school into a pimp"29 
and threaten any security and trust that women might have felt they had 
within the · law school community. Law school concretizes some of the 
centrifugal forces in contemporary society. Pious, perhaps naive, hopes for 
a consensual (micro) society were thwarted. 
I decided to convene an unscheduled meeting of the class to discuss what 
we should do, what processes we could adopt, and how we would make a 
decision as to whether or not to show the movie.· The turnout was 
disappointing-only about sixteen people attended. Assistant Dean Moss­
man, a senior female member of faculty with whom I had consulted before 
embarking on the project, also participated. 
Several conclusions emerged from the group discussion. First, it was 
agreed that simple majoritarianism would be both inappropriate and 
incapable of bearing the burden of resolving such a complex and poten-
29. Conversation with Catharine MacKinnon. 
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tially harmful process. Numbers, per se, were not enough.30 Second, the 
available options narrowed to two. One option was to show the movie but 
to require for all viewers a "facilitated" discussion that would explicate the 
harm pornography causes. The other option was to forgo showing the 
movie, because we all know the basic premises of pornography-harmless, 
victimless if sometimes tasteless, entertainment-and instead hold a discus­
sion to challenge this tolerant paradigm. I, for one, was fairly pleased with 
the outcome of this discussion, even though we failed to reach a decision on 
whether to show the movie. 
I was, however, perturbed that only about one quarter of the class 
participated in the discourse. I decided to use the second half of my four 
seminars that week to raise the issue once again in smaller forums, on the 
assumption that they might prove to be a more comfortable environment. 
Students were given the option of not attending, which several took.3 1  The 
discussions covered much of the same ground as the earlier forum. I 
concluded each· session by circulating a questionnaire (with scope for 
comments) in order to have a concrete, nonpublic basis on which a decision 
could be made. 
About two thirds of the class provided written responses. About seventy 
percent of the respondents favored showing the movie if it were supple­
mented by discussion; twenty percent favored discussion on its own; and 
ten percent referred to other options, such as bussing the students to the 
movie, which was being shown elsewhere in the city. The lack of consensus 
meant that, ultimately, the burden shifted back to me. 
After a week of reflection and balancing the options, I came to a 
decision. Acutely conscious of the weaknesses of pure majoritarianism, I 
decided that the movie would not be shown but that a discussion would take 
place. We were fortunate that the discussion would be facilitated by Susan 
Cole, a local feminist activist and journalist, and Catharine Mac Kinnon. I 
circulated a five-page memo that outlined the reasons for my decision. A 
vital element in the decision was the failure of so many of the students to 
participate in the decision-making process. I did not know whether the 
cause of the lack of participation was apathy or an incapacity or unwilling­
ness even to discuss the issue. In my opinion, the danger of the harm that 
30.  On reflection, there appear to have been two main reasons for the students' adopting an 
antimajoritarian position. First, they recognized that, given the highly charged nature of 
the issue, there could easily be a division of the class on the basis of sex. If this were to 
occur, women students would be the inevitable losers, even if they voted as a unanimous 
bloc, because they only numbered twenty-seven against the thirty-seven men in the 
section. The class as a whole was reluctant to take the risk of coming to a decision 
through a process that could so easily marginalize the viewpoint of the women in the 
class. The second, less tangible, factor is that, inspired in part by the recently acquired 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, there was a sentiment among these novice 
lawyers that majoritarianism has its limits as a democratic decision-making process and 
that other factors-for example, harm to others-are important limitational criteria. 
3 1 .  The assumption that small groups may make better forums for discussion is probably 
only true in the abstract. It all depends on what we are talking about. There may be some 
issues that, regardless of numbers, are difficult to discuss in mixed-gender groups. 
Further, because students who wished to withdraw had to exercise the option actively, I 
probably reinforced their experience of alienation from the class as a whole. 
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showing the movie might cause outweighed the possible benefits.32 
The facilitated discussion was extremely well attended, volatile but 
informative. Some felt that the facilitators were ideological twins and that 
the discussion was not comprehensive enough. It was suggested that Larry 
Flynt, or some "anticensorship activist," ought to be included. My response 
was that most of the community knows (and agrees with) the anticensorship 
stance; that approach needs no facilitated vocalization, whereas the antipor­
nography stance does. Not surprisingly, the Cole-MacKinnon perspective 
had a powerful impact on the class. 
That was the end of the public polemics but. not the private "fallout." 
The academic element of the process gained ascendancy; the class pro­
duced consistently strong memoranda of law (purged almost completely of 
explicit political preferences) and somewhat weaker factums, which did hint 
at the underlying political choices. The course ended with the moots, 
students' presentations on the legal strengths and weaknesses of the 
proposed amendment for which I and two other make-believe judges-usu-
32. Some readers may be puzzled by the decision. After such a protracted and apparently 
much-vaunted democratic process, why decide not show the movie? As the text 
indicates, two factors were central to my own thinking at that time, harm and 
participation. Although it would take considerable space to defend my position on harm 
fully, its origin can be indicated briefly. While teaching the course I had also been 
resea1·ching the feminist critique of pornography and had come to believe women when 
they tell us that they are harmed by pornography. See, e.g., Irene Diamond, Pornog­
raphy and Repression: A Reconsideration, 5 Signs 686 (1980} ; Andrea Dworkin, 
Pornography: Men Possessing Women (New York, 1981), and Against the Male Flood, 
8 Harv. Women's L.J . I (1985}; Susan Griffin, Pornography and Silence (New York, 
1981); Laura Lederer, Take Back the Night: Women on Pornography (New York, 
1980); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified 125-213 (Cambridge, Mass., 
1987) (pt. 3, Pornography). 
The participation factor also weighed heavily on me. The class was composed of 
twenty-seven women (42%) and thirty-seven men (58%). Because only two thirds of the 
class responded, I feared that the results might disproportionately reflect the views of 
the men. What if many of the women had felt that their contribution would be irrelevant 
and therefore had not responded? Further, how many of the twenty percent who 
objected to showing the movie might be women? Although I knew from my interaction 
with the students that the class was not divided on the basis of sex-some men favored 
not showing the movie, while some women thought it should be shown-I was 
concerned that a significant number of women were against showing the movie. 
Thus I found myself in a difficult situation. I had promised the students a nonhier­
archical, participatory democratic process, something different from majoritarianism, 
but I feared that majoritarianism had made its presence felt even so. Because my 
concerns about the harmful impact of pornography made me doubly disconcerted, I 
determined that the risk was too great and that the movie should not be shown. 
My decision obviously leaves me open to a variety of criticisms. In particular, I can be 
accused of paternalism, of acting as a protector or guardian of the women in the section. 
Alternatively, I can be accused of false progressivism-when things got rough, I reneged 
on my promise of participatory democracy and took refuge in the institutional 
hierarchy. 
I do not have an answer that would deal satisfactorily with either criticism. I do, 
however, have responses. Although I can never fully understand the threat that 
pornography poses for women, I have spent a couple of years trying to deal with the 
issue. I hope and honestly believe that my decision not to show the movie was based not 
on paternalism but on empathy, on an awareness of others in conditions of powerless­
ness. As to the accusation of hierarchical flight, I suppose I must plead guilty, except to 
say that I still think I made the right decision, that I avoided inflicting at least that harm, 
and that perhaps some readers will agree with my decision. 
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ally an academic and a practitioner-adjudicated.33 
I was generally pleased with the mock judiciary. I had been concerned 
about how sensitive they might be to the sexual-political issues I had raised 
for the class, but the questions they asked, in general, did not go beyond the 
pale of acceptability.34 .It did become obvious to the students, however, that 
many of the bench had come with preconceptions. Specifically, the judges 
appeared to believe that the issue of the regulation of pornography 
through a Human Rights Code35 amendment would not be within the powers 
of the provincial government, although it would certainly be within the 
competence of the federal government. When it came to the Charter issue, 
there were also clear feelings from the bench both ways. It became clear to 
the students that willful judicial preconceptions are a vital reality for legal 
practice, and that the nonpartisan bench is a myth. (Real judges, on 
occasion, manage to hide their bias more cleverly than my colleagues.) 
Although a majority of the judges expressed an opinion that the 
legislation would be better suited to the federal than the provincial sphere, 
a substantial minority disagreed.36 The Charter issue also revealed the 
panorama of political choice in judicial decision making. Despite their 
awareness that analogies could be drawn to the hate literature provisions of 
the Criminal Code37 and cases such as Keegstra, 38 most of the bench felt that 
pornography would be a form of expression and therefore protected by the 
Charter.39 With regard to whether antipornography legislation could be 
saved as "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society,"40 my 
impression was that the participants may, by a bare margin, have favored 
33. Although I made a strenuous effort to persuade as many female-although not 
necessarily feminist-''.judges" to participate, few women actively work in the constitu­
tional sphere, and among those who do, not all were able to participate in a moot that 
would keep them from returning home until I I :00 p.m. There was no shortage of male 
participants to engage in the "smut problem," as o_ne nonparticipant put it. (My response 
to this trivialization of the issue by a very highly respected member of the Canadian legal 
community, himself a member of a disadvantaged group, was to refuse to invite him to 
participate as a judge). 
34. This is, of course, from my perspective on the bench. The students may or may not 
agree. 
35. Again, I must emphasize that the way I framed the issue was distinct from Dworkin and 
MacKinnon's approach. See supra note 25. 
36. This does not necessarily apply to the Dworkin-MacKinnon approach. To raise the issue 
of legislative authority, I departed significantly from their work. Id. 
37. 281 . 1  (I) Every one who advocates or promotes genocide is guilty of an indict­
able offence and is liable to imprisonment for five years. 
(2) In this section "genocide" means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy in whole or in pan any identifiable group, namely: 
(a) killing members of the group, or 
(b) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction. 
(3) No proceeding for an offence under this section shall be instituted without 
the consent of the Attorney General. 
(4) In this section "identifiable group" means any section of the public 
distinguished by colour, race, religion or ethnic origin. 
An Act to Amend the Criminal Code, R.S.C. ch. I I  (1st Supp. 1970). 
38. Regina v. Keegstra, 19 Can. Crim. Cases 3d 254 (1985) (hate literature is not 
constitutionally protected expression). 
39. "Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms . . . freedom of thought, belief, 
opinion and expression including freedom of the press and other media of communi­
cation." Can. Chart. Rights & Freedoms, supra note 28, at § 2(b). 
40. Id. at § l .  
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the legislation as constitutionally valid. Some were persuaded by the 
arguments that charter guarantees of equality4 1  were sufficient to trump 
the freedom of expression clause, while others opined more candidly that 
if such legislation did manage to get through a legislature, it would be 
"unwise" for a court to strike it down as unconstitutional.42 
II. The Road to Hell 
I believe in education; I believe in the emancipatory and expansionist 
potential of legal education; I believe that lawyers, as persons and as power 
holders, may have a positive impact on social interaction. I began the 
project as an optimist. I sought to introduce sixty-four legal acolytes to a 
radically new, energizing, and controversial perspective on law. I ·had 
hoped that education could make a difference. I had no aspiration to 
convert the class. My aim was more modest: to open horizons, to introduce 
the class to the sexual politics of law. 
At the same tirrie, however, I was concerned that the project might 
backfire; that instead of giving my institutional and personal support to 
feminism, 1 would activate a reactionary, negative dynamic that would 
further alienate feminism as a politicolegal movement and intensify the 
harm or hurt that some women experience in the male-dominated 
classroom.43 I considered the risk at length,44 and now, after the process is 
over, I still am not certain that I took sufficient measures to avoid harm. 
On the positive side, I created a legal-educational environment in which 
certain aspects of feminism became a live issue, in which certain feminist 
voices were heard,45 and their arguments were implanted in the psyche of 
all members of the class. People who had never encountered a feminist 
perspective were coerced into at least reading some feminist materials. I am 
optimistic that never again will any of the class watch a pornographic movie 
4 1 .  ( I )  Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the 
equal protection and equal benefit of
° 
the law without discrimination and, in 
particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, 
religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
(2) Subsection (1)  does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its 
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups 
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic origin, 
colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability. 
Id. at § 15( 1 )  & (2). 
Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred to in 
it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons. 
Id. at § 28. 
42. Again, I must add that these are only impressions of a group of pseudojudges. I would 
make no predictions as to what a real outcome would be if amipornography legislation 
-came into existence in Canada. 
43. The claim that law school is male dominated is a reference to law schools in general and 
does not identify Osgoode Hall in particular. For discussions of the pervasive and 
systematic nature of male domination in the legal academy, see supra note 4. 
44. In particular, I discussed the project with Assistant Dean Mossman, who provided both 
criticism and encouragement. 
45. Hearing, of course, is not the same as listening or understanding, but it is a prerequisite 
for either. 
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without an awareness of a feminist critique. Although they may well reject, 
ridicule, banish, or delegitimize that perspective, they will do so deliber­
ately. They will be aware that there is a choice-and that was my minimum 
goal. 
I had also hoped that some of the students would see merit in the 
feminist perspective on law, develop an interest, and pursue further 
discussion, courses, research, or activity. I had hoped that legal education 
could stimulate a progressive, socially responsible dynamic in peoples' lives. 
Furthermore, I had sought to legitimize feminist interpretations of law, first 
by using my institutionalized power as instructor to support them, and 
second by introducing their intrinsic validity, vitality, and veracity. In  short, 
I had aspired to be a good educator, to "teach as if women really 
mattered,''46 to open up horizons, and to make the politics of law real. 
But such aspirations are no guarantee agains_t myopic or dangerous 
behavior. I have made mistakes, some dangerous and hurtful. I ought, for 
instance, to have thought through more clearly how I was going to 
introduce the problem to the class. On the first day back after Christmas 
break, at 9:00 a.m. on a Monday morning, I opened with the novel legal 
claim that pornography harms women and asked, Is  it constitutionally 
legitimate? Should we see a pornographic movie in the law school? Can we 
create a nonrepressive decision-making process? All of this was too open­
ended, too much to ask, too unstructured. This was compounded by 
nervous hyperactivity on my part. 
I also wonder whether I should have been so ambitious as to raise the 
question of how we decide whether to show the movie. I assumed that there 
was scope for rational discussion, debate, and cross-communication, and 
therefore naively betrayed an undue optimism for consensus. Perhaps 
people (different genders) live in different worlds, which makes real 
communication-in terms of mutual receptivity-impossible. It  is utopian 
to expect an LRW class to solve the problem of fundamental communica­
tive and experiential disjunction. 
Furthermore, seeking gender neutrality when I set up the hypothetical 
problem, I posited the person trafficking in pornography to be a woman. 
This was a double error. First, it is descriptively inaccurate and therefore 
undercuts the reality that I was trying to evoke. Second, it provided 
ammunition for the antifeminists to say, "See, femini$t efforts will haunt 
you . . . .  Serves you right." 
When it came to the factums and the moot, I did not provide the 
students with a choice as to whether they would argue in favor or against 
the antipornography legislation. This meant that to get the grades, students 
had to develop and articulate arguments that might be anathematical to 
their life experiences and beliefs:  they would have to write and say things 
that they simply did not believe. For some this could prove painful, even 
detrimental. 
46. Christine Boyle, Teaching Law As If Women Really Mattered, or, What About the 
Washrooms, 2 Can. J. Women & L. 96 ( 1 988). 
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I also put an extra burden on women who might already have been 
experiencing the problems of participating in a male-dominated law 
school.47 Not only did they have to fulfill the academic requirements, some 
may have experienced the abusive impact of pornography in their own 
Jives. To have to cope with both within the context of the class could be an 
immense strain. 
A further problem is that I exposed the women of the class to the danger 
of a vicious antifeminist backlash. In the "public sphere," everything 
appeared to be rational, tolerant, and communicative (however animated). 
But in the "private realm," in the corridors, the cafeteria, the washrooms, 
the library, and apartments, the seedy side of the debate reared its ugly 
head. Wild accusations flew, feminism was ridiculed and disparaged, 
phallocentric logic entered the fray, and obscene phone calls were received. 
By dropping the pornography grenade in the cozy environment of law 
school, I may well have polarized opinion, reinforced general entrench­
ment, and further pressed the foot upon women's necks.48 
This leads me to another point of concern. As I have stated, my aim was 
to reinforce the feminist approach to law, and therefore I had hoped to 
receive some response-even criticism-from students I believed to be 
feminists. I was disappointed when this was not forthcoming. Although I 
tried to elicit feedback, I encountered what I felt to be abstentionism and 
inability. I think this is how power comes back to haunt the powerholder. 
First, I am a teacher; students are unwilling to risk openness with those who 
hold coercive power over them. Second, and I believe more important in 
this situation, I am a male. A male who apparently adopts a profeminist 
position is immediately suspect. His gender renders him incapable of 
experiencing the inequality, indignity, and pain that women suffer. When 
this male makes mistakes, it heightens concerns and twists the foot. At best, 
he is playing games; at worst, he is seeking some advantage. Indeed, I was 
asked, "What are you getting out of this?"49 
ln one sense, however, the portrait of nonresponsiveness is not totally 
accurate. By the end of the term, I had in fact received feedback, but for me 
at least it was from a surprising source, one that hurt. In retrospect, it was 
a response that says a great deal. With one feminist student in the class, I 
had been able to engage in a dialogue that focused directly on the 
connection between education, pornography, and power(lessness). In the 
47. See supra note 43. For a more specific indictment of Osgoode Hall Law School, see Mary 
Lou Fassell et al. v. Harry Arthurs, York University and Osgoode Hall Law School 
(September 1987) (on file with author). This complaint advances the novel claim that 
students and practitioners in Ontario have been unjustifiably discriminated against on 
the basis of sex because York University failed to appoint as dean of the law school a 
suitably qualified female candidate, Assistant Dean Mossman. (The events recounted in 
this article were contemporaneous with Mary Jane Mossman's candidature for the 
deanship.) 
48. The phrase comes from Catharine MacKinnon, supra note 32, at 30. 
49. A statement by Stephanie Wildman helps me understand beuer some of the silence that 
I encountered: '"[S]ilence may be a valid expression of alienation or hostility. For many 
students the choice of silence is not a passive act; it is an expression of anger." Stephanie 
Wildman, The Question of Silence: Techniques to Ensure Full Class Participation, 38 J. 
Legal Educ. 147, 149 (1988). 
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course of one of our conversations towards the end of the term, she 
mentioned that "some students needed outside help" to get through the 
assignment. It was unclear to me what she meant by this, and when I sought 
elaboration she was unwilling or unable to say anything more. I was deeply 
troubled; more so because I did not know what "outside help" meant. I 
worried that perhaps psychiatric help had been necessary for some of the 
students. I feared that the worst had happened, that the whole process had 
a negative impact on the very persons it had been intended to support. I 
was anguished. 
Within a day or so, I met Assistant Dean Mossman in the corridor. In the 
course of our conversation, she informed me that she had received a phone 
call from the sexual harassment center at the university, inquiring about 
whether she knew what was going on in my class. She did, because she had 
been the person with whom I had consulted about raising the issue of 
pornography. The upshot of our conversation was that the staff at the 
sexual harassment center had been counseling several of the students in my 
class. The counselors had inquired whether it would be a good idea to meet 
with me. Professor Mossman had informed them that she was sure that I 
would want to meet with them, and I confirmed that this was my position. 
But it was a position with which I was extremely uncomfortable. My 
initial response was disbelief-this could not be a sexual harassment 
complaint, my intentions were exactly the opposite. Then I was hurt; why 
me, I'm the good guy, why not go for some of the others whom I know to 
be blatantly sexist? Then I was frightened, indeed sick, because of what I 
felt that this could mean for my reputation-and career.50 And finally, I 
was angry-this simply was not fair. I did, however, want to speak to the 
people at the sexual harassment center: first, to find out exactly what 
problems led to this tum of events; second, to get some feedback, even if it 
had to be from this source; and third, to be as open and honest as possible 
about the project, my purposes, my intentions, my aspirations. At the same 
time, the sexual harassment context was both frightening and painful for 
me. 
Within a few days, I received a call from a counselor at the center, and 
we arranged to have coffee together. I was certainly keyed up for the 
meeting. Two members of the center, one finishing her Ph.D. in English, 
the other a graduate student in psychology met with me. They very quickly 
set the terms of the discourse. No complaint of sexual harassment had been 
made against me; rather, several women had experienced a high level of 
pressure from dealing with an assignment based on pornography. My 
response was both relief and continued anxiety. At this stage in the 
conversation, relief was certainly the stronger emotion. I became increas­
ingly perturbed, however, by the concerns they articulated. The basic 
50. I have strong reservations about even compiling my recollections. The idea of recording 
and sharing the experiences was suggested by a friend when the project was at an 
advanced stage. Later, when I mentioned to some of the students that I was writing 
about the experience, at least one felt as if she was part of an experiment, a guinea pig 
on the academic treadmill. I have attempted to weigh this concern against the possible 
benefits of sharing the experience with other progressive teachers. 
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proposition the members of the center put forward was that some of the 
structures that I had set up made it extremely problematic for the women 
students to participate in the process. 
First, my taking so long to determine whether or not the movie ought to 
be shown created a great deal of anxiety and tension. It made life very 
difficult, and instead of working as a process of empowerment, it just 
created anguish. In short, people did not feel empowered by the process. 
Second, one of the major criticisms was that in assigning people for the 
factums and moots I had forced some of the students to argue for a 
viewpoint that they personally opposed. Certain women in the class had to 
argue in favor or against the amendment, and this proved extremely 
problematic for them. Indeed, one of the counselors, who was working on 
her Ph.D. in the field of the psychological impact of pornography, 
suggested that the imposition of roles could create not just anguish but 
extreme cognitive dissonance, leading to sleepless nights, identity crises, 
and internal contradict:ions. Clearly, this was not something I had thought 
about adequately. Some of the students apparently believed that I had 
deliberately chosen to put women on one side rather than the other, that I 
had forced them to argue against that which they believed.51 
Third, towards the end of the conversation, I suggested that one of my 
concerns was that I had received very little feedback from the feminist 
students. I pointed out my awareness that I was male, white, and in a 
position of power, and that I was conscious that it was very difficult to 
minimize or negate this power. One of the counselors pointed out that I 
tend to be rather aggressive in my discourse, that I very quickly conceptu­
alize issues, and that I tend to dominate situations. She pointed out that 
such personality traits have a negative impact on those who may wish to 
discuss issues with me. Personal characteristics have direct political 
consequences.52 I was already aware of this and had been trying to work on 
it-obviously not adequately. 
The conversation concluded on the following terms. Although on this 
occasion there was no complaint of sexual harassment, the situation that I 
had created was such that, in the opinion of the counsellors, many of the 
symptoms of sexual harassment had manifested themselves. Indeed, it was 
suggested that if a similar situation were to occur again, there would be a 
possibility of an investigation to determine whether sexual harassment was 
51. This perception was not accurate. Rather, I had allowed the students to choose other 
students with whom they felt they could work comfort.ably. I then tried to match each 
pair against another pair whom I believed to be of equivalent academic calibre. As to the 
issue of whether students were to be appellants or respondents, the criterion was 
completely arbitrary. The first couple within each team was assigned the role of 
appellant, the second the role of respondent. As indicated, the assignment had a 
negative impact. I t  is a classic example of a situation in which the belief that "pure 
arbitrariness equals fairness" creates substantive inequality despite the appearance of 
- formal equality. This was a factor that I had never even considered. 
52. The motivating factor for the statement was that at one point in the discussion, one of 
the counsellors appeared to become quite angry and asked me, "What, are you a 
therapist?" My response was to say, "of course not," but that I had attempted to be as 
aware of the issues and the potential downside risks and harms as possible. I continue to 
worry about the question, for some feminists have decoded "therapist" as "the/rapist". 
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actually taking place. So much for authorial intent. 
III. Postscript 
To construct a conclusion for a paper such as this would be singularly 
inappropriate. Experiences are integral to peoples' histories/herstories; 
they are constitutive of their identities and, as such, they have an ongoing 
impact. Tidy conclusions obscure more than they reveal. Nevertheless, I do 
wish to add a few comments. 
First, there is the danger of "imperial scholarship," which Richard 
Delgado describes as "factual ignorance or naivete, . . .  failure of empa­
thy, an inability to share values, desires, and perspectives of the population 
whose rights are under consideration."53 Put differently, can or should a 
man, even if he is profeminist, attempt to raise concerns that are of 
particular relevance to women? Does he experience enough, can he know 
enough to carry through the project without harming those he hopes to 
encourage and support? My article does not purport to answer such a 
question but simply to raise it. More generally, it highlights the issue of 
what the nature of a coalition between the women's movement and 
"progressive" men might be, and on whose and what terms it can be 
constructed. More fundamentally, is such a coalition even possible?54 
Second, if we are able to reach some sort of consensus about the role 
men might play in the "deghettoization" of womens' issues, then men must 
act with extreme caution. Good intentions are not enough. So pervasive and 
systemic are the structures of inequality, domination, and powerlessness 
that a great deal of planning, consultation, and awareness must be invested 
before embarking on such a project. Undoubtedly exigencies, both predict­
able and unforeseen, will crop up, and one must be as prepared as possible 
to deal with them. Group support and criticism are essential. The events I 
recount are an example of the very real dangers that can emerge for 
students if a teacher does not exercise extreme caution in the pursuit of a 
53. Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights 
Literature, 1 32 U. Pa. L. Rev. 561 ,  568 (1984). Delgado provides "an a priori list of 
reasons why we might look with concern on a situation in which the scholarship about 
group A is written by members of group B." 
First, members of group B may be ineffective advocates of the rights and interests 
of persons in group A .  They may lack information; more important, perhaps, 
they may lack passion, or that passion may be misdirected. B's scholarship may 
tend to be sentimental, diffusing passion in useless directions, or wasting lime on 
unproductive breast-beating. Second, while the B's might advocate effectively, 
they might advocate the wrong things. Their agenda may differ from that of the 
A's, they may pull their punches with respect to remedies, especially where 
remedying A's situation entails uncomfortable consequences for B. Despite the 
best of intentions, B's may have stereotypes embedded deep in their psyches that 
diston their thinking, causing them to balance interests in ways inimical to A's. 
Finally, domination by members of group B may paralyze members of group A, 
causing the A's to forget how to flex their legal muscles for themselves. 
Id. at 567. Pedagogy shares the same dilemmas as scholarship. 
54. For a panicularly useful collection of essays on this topic see Alice Jardine & Paul Smith, 
Men in Feminism (New York, 1987). 
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progressive pedagogy. I made some serio�s errors that did undoubtedly 
cause harm, but I still hope that the process was worth the effort, that the 
benefits outweighed the disadvantages. But, in truth, I do not know. 
Would I do it again? At this point I am unsure. My intention is not to go 
around Canadian law schools traumatizing students and aggravating the 
alienation that many women experience in the legal community. But I 
remain committed to the ideal of progressive legal education and continue 
to believe that feminist concerns should be moved out of the ghetto of 
women's studies and into mainstream education, including legal education. 
I have gone on to teach Jurisprudence at a different law school, and 
although I still consider the issue of the legal regulation of pornography to 
be both an appropriate topic in itself and also an excellent vehicle for 
concretizing and unpacking the basic value structures of competing juris­
prudential traditions, including feminism, I have resisted the temptation of 
making pornography the organizing theme. Instead, I have used the Baby 
M case.55 Still, I am no� even comfortable about this choice. If  it is true that 
to raise the issue of pornography (or perhaps any other topic that is of 
particular concern to women) is to risk creating the "symptoms" of sexual 
harassment and provoking a virulent antifeminist backlash, then it may not 
be possible to construct a progressive legal education that does not intensify 
the pain that already saturates contemporary legal pedagogy. 
55. See Richard F. Devlin, "Baby M": The Contractual Legitimation of Misogyny, 10 Rep. 
Fam. L. 4 (1 987). 
